Global Economic Crisis

A major point made by others and me is that a high ratio of national debt to GDP creates a substantially elevated risk of inflation. Furthermore, I suggest that this may lead to a conclusion by decision-makers that the only policy response that can reduce this dangerous ratio of public indebtedness is to allow high levels of inflation, which in turn “grows” the nominal GDP not through higher output of goods and services, but through reduction of the constant value of the currency. Professor Krugman is dismissive of this point, making reference to the United States having a level of public debt that exceeded the GDP right after World War II, without severe consequences.

Let us look at the facts. The United States ended World War II with a labor force, including a substantial military, which was fully employed but had been restricted in the opportunities to spend disposable income. This was due to rationing on basic commodities such as foodstuffs, and the termination of production of major consumer durables such as automobiles owing to industrial mobilization in support of the war effort. After VJ day the pent-up consumer demand exploded, while consumer goods remained in short supply in the immediate post-war period. The result was a combination of real growth and high inflation, both dynamics contributing to the attenuation of the public debt to GDP ratio. Thus in 1946, the national debt ratio reached its highest level, 121%. By 1948, that ratio had declined significantly, at 93.7%. Now, let us observe the inflation rate during this period: 8.3% in 1946, a staggering 14.4% in 1947 and 8.1% in 1948. These figures clearly demonstrate that having a level of public debt exceeding 100% of the GDP does have inflationary consequences, and suggests that inflation in turn reduces the real value of the nominal public debt as a proportion of national GDP.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Paul Krugman’s piece, beyond superficial and trivializing dismissal of those he disagrees with on the question of high levels of deficit spending, is his marginalization of those he disputes by resorting to rhetorical generalizations. Thus, he issues this inexplicable diagnosis of those who hold economic views that are contrary to his own: “But it’s hard to escape the sense that the current inflation fear-mongering is partly political, coming largely from economists who had no problem with deficits caused by tax cuts but suddenly became fiscal scolds when the government started spending money to rescue the economy. And their goal seems to be to bully the Obama administration into abandoning those rescue efforts.”

One of the inflation fear mongers is a supporter of President Obama’s stimulus spending program, NYU economics professor Nouriel Roubini. This is what he had to say at a recent symposium on the economic crisis, which Professor Krugman also participated in: “…we have to worry about the long run. If we’re going to finance budget deficits by printing money, we may have high inflation, even risk of hyperinflation in some countries. That’s what happened in Germany in the 1920s during the Weimar Republic. We are having large budget deficits and increasing the public debt, we don’t know whether it’s going to be $5 trillion or $10 trillion of more debt. But there are only a few ways of resolving that debt problem: either you default on it as countries like Argentina did; or you use the inflation tax to wipe out the real value of the debt; or you have to raise taxes and cut government spending. And given the size of the deficits, over time that’s going to be a painful political choice to make. So we need the stimulus in the short run, but we need to restore medium-term fiscal sustainability.”

Another supporter of President Obama’s economic policies, who also opposed George W. Bush’s deficit-financed tax cuts, is billionaire investor Warren Buffet. This is what the oracle of Omaha had to say about the linkage between high public debt to GDP ratios and the risk of inflation: “A country that continuously expands its debt as a percentage of GDP and raises much of the money abroad to finance that, at some point, it’s going to inflate its way out of the burden of that debt.”

In writing off those observers who are concerned about the inflationary dangers emerging from the exploding national debt, Paul Krugman resorts to paraphrasing Franklin Roosevelt, claiming the only thing we have to fear about inflation is the fear of inflation itself. It seems, however, that there is one authority that is of like mind with Professor Krugman. In December 2002, Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, about to be fired for opposing the Bush tax cuts, had a meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney. In response to O’Neill’s warning of the long-term implications for the nation’s economic health of escalating federal deficits, Cheney told the soon-to-be but prescient ex-Treasury Secretary, “You know, Paul, Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.”

I never thought I would witness the day when Paul Krugman and Dick Cheney agree on economic policy.

The current monetary and fiscal policies being enacted by the key economic decision-makers in the United States are laying the groundwork for a far more dangerous inflationary environment than anything encountered by Paul Volcker. The explosive growth in the money supply and government debt is simply unsustainable without severe inflation. It must be kept in mind that the Federal government is not the only public authority engaged in massive deficit spending. Throughout America, state, county and municipal governments are faced with imploding tax revenues and lack the ability or political flexibility to cut services to a level commensurate with revenue flows. Both the Fed and the public sector are engaging in a reckless gamble; borrow like crazy in the hope that this overdose of economic stimulation will restore growth to the economy and normal tax revenues, leading to a decreased and sustainable level of public sector indebtedness.

If one believes that the policymakers running the Federal Reserve, Treasury and Federal government, the same architects of the Global Economic Crisis, are smart enough to now get everything right, perhaps we may escape the worst consequences of their turbo-charged fiscal and monetary policies. However, there are growing indications that global investors and the broader market are beginning to reach a far more sobering assessment.

In an interview with Bloomberg News, Bill Gross, co-chief investment officer of PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Company) suggested that the coveted AAA credit rating U.S. government debt now benefits from will eventually be downgraded. “The markets are beginning to anticipate the possibility of a downgrade,” Gross said.

China, the major purchaser of Treasuries and holder of $1 trillion of U.S. government debt, is already on record as expressing concern for the integrity of its American investments, and has begun actively exploring alternatives to the U.S. dollar as the primary global reserve currency. These moves by China are not based on fears of expropriation of its U.S. assets, but focuses on the specter of hyperinflation destroying much of the value of assets denominated in U.S. dollars. No doubt China’s economic experts are well aware of the growing number of economists who are convinced that the U.S. will be unable to service its rapidly expanding debt burden without significant inflation. Inflation in monetary terms means the erosion of the intrinsic value of the American dollar.

What is most frightening about the policy moves being enacted by the Fed and Treasury is that their actions may not be a reckless gamble after all. They may have come to the conclusion that only hyperinflation will enable the United Sates to avoid national insolvency. In effect, they may be pursuing the exact opposite course undertaken by Paul Volcker in the early 1980’s. If that is their prescription for the dire economic crisis confronting the U.S., then one must conclude that Ben Bernanke, Timothy Geithner and Larry Summers have learned nothing from history Once the spigot of hyperinflation is tuned on, it becomes a cascading torrent that is almost impossible to switch off, and which in its wake inflicts inconceivable levels of economic, political and social devastation. Before it is too late, President Obama should put the brakes on his economic team’s dangerous gamble with the haunting specter of hyperinflation. If he fails to act in time, a hellish prospect may be his economic and political legacy.